A general trend towards increased military spending as an easily visible response to complex challenges Eu funding is part of a general trend towards a drastic increase in military spending in Europe: EU NATO member states have pledged to increase their national military spending to 2% of GDP, with a particular focus on capabilities. Warsaw Convention in July 2016. Although it is a non-binding political commitment, it is often presented to the public as a “commitment.” In practical terms, this would represent on average a 30% increase in military spending by EU Member States compared to 2014, but for some countries, more than doubling their military spending! Most EU Member States have begun to increase their national military spending and an increasing number will reach the 2% threshold. A similar requirement was incorporated into the recent Structured Cooperation Agreement (CSF), which includes the use of 20% of this expenditure for defence investments. Once again, it seems that simplistic messages are being sent to the general public with the support of complacent or lazy mass media. Today, all political leaders are well aware that the European Defence Fund will not save money at all, but will instead contribute to a radical increase in military spending in Europe. The Lisbon Treaty has formalised a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and a common security and defence policy (PSDC), but both remain purely intergovernmental policies, meaning that they are under the control of only Member States. And in practice, most decisions are made according to the rule of unanimity by national governments alone. The EP can only issue non-binding opinions and the Commission does not have the power to launch legislative proposals in this area. In addition, Article 41 kills (eu-treaty) excludes the use of the EU`s common budget for operating expenses with a military or defence impact. How, then, could the Commission justify its proposal for defence funds from a legal point of view? With regard to pilot projects and preparatory actions, they must test new areas of action and the EC does not need to justify the EC`s competence in proposing a PP or a Palestinian Authority in a given area. The legal basis was therefore not really a problem at the time of the decision on the pilot project or on the preparatory action on defence research, although it can already be said that it is contrary to the EU`s values of peace. On the other hand, the European Defence Industrial Development Programme for 20-2020 (EDIDP, Q7) and the draft regulation for the Defence Fund 2021-2027 are legislative proposals and therefore constitute a clear legal basis: the EC has chosen Article 173 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFUE, part of the Lisbon Treaty), which recognises its competence in industrial matters.
This could be seen as confirmation that the Fund`s primary objective is to stimulate an industrial sector and its competitiveness rather than contribute to the promotion of a `defence EU`.